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This paper provides evidence of the impact of the new European bank resolution regime on the 
sovereign-bank nexus. The implementation of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) is 
considered as an exogenous shock which provides the setting for a natural experiment. This 
investigation tests the financial markets’ perception of the effectiveness of the new rules in weakening 
the tight interconnectedness between sovereign and bank risk. A Difference-in-Differences (DiD) 
approach is adopted, building evidence from the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market for banks and non-
financial corporates over the period 2011-18. The main findings do not indicate a significant 
weakening in the interaction between bank and sovereign CDS spreads, compared to the 
corresponding evidence for the non-financial corporate sector. An overall narrowing of the gap 
between bank and sovereign risk occurs, which initially implies a lack of credibility of the BRRD in 
financial markets. However, substantial cross-country variations are identified, particularly for Italy 
and non-euro area countries. These insights make a significant contribution to the policy debate on 
effective regulation of the sovereign-bank nexus, in the light of recent developments in the EU post-
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1 Introduction 
“Resolution is a collective action problem and to make it effective the various stakeholders need to 
have ex ante clarity and confidence on the rules of the game” (Enria, 2015) 
 
The sovereign-bank nexus attracted widespread attention during and after the European 
sovereign debt crisis (e.g. De Bruyckere et al., 2013; Acharya et al., 2014; Farhi and Tirole, 2017). 
Concerns surrounding this phenomenon motivated the European Banking Union (BU) project and its 
three main pillars, i.e. Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). The spectrum of common rules, which apply to all EU 
Member States, are the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and fourth Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD) approved in 2013, the Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSs) adopted in 
2014, and the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) agreed in 2014 and which came into 
force in January 2015.1 The BRRD represents a vital step in safeguarding financial stability in Europe, 
particularly in mitigating moral hazard and other issues associated with a strong reliance on public 
bailouts (Benczur et al., 2017; Hüser et al., 2018). 
 The BRRD introduced a common framework to quickly and effectively wind up failing European 
banks and investment firms.2 It entails four key elements: (i) the preparation and prevention of failures 
through recovery and resolution planning (“living wills”); (ii) early intervention powers; (iii) the 
application of resolution tools and powers in a case of bank failure; and (iv) coordination between 
national authorities.3 The range of resolution instruments includes the sale of business, the creation 
of a bridge institution, the asset separation and the bail-in mechanism. The new regime aims to 
protect taxpayers’ money and avoid costly state-funded bailouts, while maintaining market 
discipline.4 
To facilitate orderly resolutions, the BRRD prescribes that institutions are also required to 
maintain, at all times, a robust minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) as 
a percentage of their total liabilities and own funds. This requirement is set in order to prevent the 
possibility of a liability structure that undermines the effectiveness of the bail-in or other resolution 
instruments, and to reduce the risk of spillover or a bank run. Therefore, the MREL ensures adequate 
loss absorbing capacity, which in turn should permit an orderly resolution, without causing financial 
                                                     
1 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Directive 2013/36/EU, Directive 2014/49/EU and Directive 2014/59/EU, respectively.  
2 In the euro area, the BRRD has been implemented through the SRM. The BRRD applies to all credit institutions and 
large investment firms, including their EU incorporated holding companies and subsidiaries (Article 1).  
3 Banks are required to prepare and maintain recovery plans which indicate the measures to be adopted in various 
potential risk scenarios. Resolution authorities, in cooperation with supervisory authorities, are required to develop 
resolution plans for individual banks. 
4 Bank’s shareholders and creditors (junior, unsecured senior and insured depositors above €100.000) must bear losses 
equivalent to at least 8% of the bank’s liabilities, including own funds. Writing down and/or converting stakeholders’ 
claims into equity represents a precondition for access to the national resolution fund or to direct recapitalization via 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), up to 5% of the bank’s total liabilities. 
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instability and the recourse to public money. Overall, the BRRD is considered as a paradigm shift, 
which marked the end of the culture of bail-out and the beginning of the culture of bail-in. In principle, 
large European countries with solid public finances can no longer provide implicit subsidies of public 
support to their national banks, therefore eliminating a potential source of competitive advantage. 
Similarly, countries with weak public finances and smaller institutions are no longer able to support 
and promote their national champions (e.g. Constâncio, 2014). 
In this context, the implementation of the BRRD can be considered as an exogenous shock, which 
involved the whole European banking sector. This event provides the setting for a natural experiment 
to test financial market perceptions about the effectiveness of the new resolution rules in weakening 
the sovereign-bank nexus. The success of the new regime to resolve banks requires that financial 
markets perceive it as credible and effective (Huertas, 2016). If there is no confidence that bank 
failures can be managed in an orderly manner and market participants still expect government 
intervention, the resolution procedure could lead to major and more severe turmoil. Reinforced legal 
and factual certainty can engender confidence at a time of distress, while restoring market discipline 
and appropriate pricing during normal times (Enria, 2015). Effective and credible resolution regimes 
are therefore crucial not only to minimize the costs associated with bank failures, but also to reduce 
the ex ante probability of default by incentivising more prudent behaviour (Ignatowski and Korte, 
2014). To some extent, the issue of credibility has arisen in the Italian cases of two Veneto banks and 
the state aid to Banca Monte dei Paschi Siena SpA.5 
This paper investigates the impact of the new EU resolution regime upon the sovereign-bank 
nexus. Drawing evidence from the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market, we exploit the introduction of 
the BRRD and employ Difference-in-Differences (DiD) estimation where banks act as the treatment 
group and non-financial corporates as the control group.6 The main hypothesis underlying the analysis 
is that the intervention was expected to impact the sovereign to non-sovereign link in the case of 
banks (treated entities), while leaving unaffected the sovereign-corporate link. In this light, a reduced 
interconnection between sovereign and bank CDS spreads was anticipated. To preview the main 
findings, there are indications that market participants did not assess the implementation of the BRRD 
as credible in loosening the negative loop between sovereign and bank risk. These inferences are 
robust to using alternative model specifications and country groupings. However, in support to initial 
predictions, substantial variation is revealed across countries. In particular, the strongest credibility of 
the regime is revealed in Italy, whereas counter-intuitive results are reported for non-euro area 
countries. 
                                                     
5 In June 2017, Banca Popolare di Vicenza SpA and Veneto Banca SpA were rescued by the Italian government with an 
injection of €17bn. In July 2017, the European Commission (EC) approved €5.4bn in state aid for the precautionary 
recapitalisation of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA.   
6 As the setup for a DiD estimation is appropriate, we constructed our empirical strategy in a similar fashion to 
Ignatowski and Korte (2014), Fiordelisi et al. (2017), Gropp et al. (2019), among others. 
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The paper offers the following key contributions to the existing literature. We provide new 
insights into recent policy debates on how to effectively weaken the sovereign-bank nexus in Europe 
and avoid its reignition. Unlike prior literature (e.g. De Bruyckere et al. 2013; Breckenfelder and 
Schwaab, 2018; Fratzscher and Rieth, 2019), which focuses on the determinants and relevance of the 
main transmission channels between bank and sovereign risk, our paper investigates how financial 
market participants evaluate the implementation of the BRRD as a means to weaken the sovereign-
bank nexus. To this extent, our results point towards the importance of adopting credible and 
consistent rules, which can be easily assessed by financial markets. The existence of discrepancies in 
implementation could undermine the effectiveness of the new bank resolution regime. Furthermore, 
the existing differences among countries are likely to influence market participant perceptions, 
especially when considering cross-border banks. Fostering greater harmonization and cooperation is 
therefore crucial to achieve a credible and effective resolution framework.  
In addition, our analysis contributes to the very limited empirical evidence on the new bank 
resolution regime in Europe. Whereas Conlon and Cotter (2014), Schäfer et al. (2016), Benczur et al. 
(2017) and Hüser et al. (2018) focus on the bail-in mechanism, this paper is unique in addressing the 
overall EU resolution framework and its effectiveness. The evidence supports calls for a timely 
completion of the wider project of BU in Europe and to some extent provides rationale for revisions 
to the BRRD, consistent to those of the 2019 EU banking package.7 Weakening the sovereign-bank 
nexus, while preserving financial stability, represent the main objectives of the ongoing post-crisis 
regulatory reforms in Europe. Our findings advance the debate on these issues.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on 
the sovereign-bank nexus in Europe. Section 3 discusses the data, the identification strategy and the 
empirical methodology. Section 4 outlines the main hypotheses. Section 5 reports the empirical 
results and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
                                                     
7 Proposed in November 2016 by the EC, and approved in April 2019 by the European Parliament (EP), the banking 
package includes reforms which aim to make the European banking sector more resilient and able to withstand 
potential shocks. The amendments involve the CRR/CRD, the BRRD and the SRM regulation. 
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2 Evidence on the sovereign-bank nexus  
The strong inter-linkage between bank and sovereign risk emerged as a troublesome feature of 
the European sovereign debt crisis, which started in Greece in late 2009. Bolton and Jeanne (2011, 
p.5) state that “financial integration, bank fragility and contagion have been at the core of the crisis”. 
The spillover between government and bank credit risk occurred in both directions with the potential 
for mutual contagion effects.8 Weakening this powerful interconnection, which still represents a key 
element of the post-crisis regulatory reform agenda, would improve countries’ economic resilience 
and strengthen banks (Laeven, 2019).  
For 2007-10, Acharya et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence for a two-way feedback between 
sovereign and bank risk in the euro area. Specifically, these authors highlight a significant post-bailout 
co-movement between the CDS spreads of sovereigns and financial firms. Alter and Shuler (2012) 
examine the interaction of the default risk for seven euro area countries and their domestic banks for 
2007-10. They suggest that the pre-bailout direction of spillover is from the financial sector to 
sovereign, while during the post-bailout period government CDS spreads are the drivers of banks’ CDS 
spreads. Dieckmann and Plank (2012) find evidence of a public-to-private risk transfer in European 
countries providing government support to their banking systems. In addition, they argue that this 
transfer is more significant in euro area countries due to their higher sensitivity to the health of the 
integrated financial system. 
During periods of banking crisis, the implicit public guarantees to the domestic sector assume an 
influential role, inducing negative consequences for sovereign risk (Gerlach et al., 2010; Laeven, 2019). 
Bicu and Candelon (2013), employing BIS cross-border data on banking exposures and CDS spreads, 
investigate the potential spillover between bank and sovereign distress in the euro area, with a focus 
on the importance of direct and indirect financial exposures. They note that indirect connections 
represent a significant channel for risk transfer and that aggregate vulnerabilities of national banking 
systems are underestimated when these links are not considered. De Bruyckere et al. (2013) 
document the presence of contagion between bank and sovereign credit risk in Europe for 2007-12. 
These authors provide evidence of the existence of multiple risk transmission channels (i.e. asset 
holding channel, guarantee channel and collateral channel) and highlight some bank- and country-
specific variables that potentially drive contagion.  
Avino and Cotter (2014) assess the relationship between sovereign and bank CDS spreads, 
focusing on the ability of these indicators to provide timely signals of the potential default risk of 
European governments and their banking systems. For six European countries in 2004-13, the authors 
                                                     
8 There are four main channels through which sovereign risk affects banking risk (BIS, 2011). Some work via the asset 
side of bank balance sheets, whilst others are on the liabilities side (Angelini et al., 2014; Laeven, 2019). As observed 
in Iceland (2008), Ireland (2008) and Cyprus (2013), contagion can occur in either direction.  
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find evidence of inter-linkages between sovereigns and their respective banking sectors. Furthermore, 
in investigating the underlying price discovery mechanism, they document cross-country differences 
over time. In more stable countries (Germany and Sweden), bank CDS spreads show a leading role 
over the entire sample period, while in the case of peripheral distressed economies (Portugal and 
Spain), the leading role is assumed by sovereign CDS spreads, during both the sub-prime and European 
sovereign debt crises.  
Alter and Beyer (2014) propose an empirical approach to measure the spillover effects between 
sovereign credit markets and systemically important banks in the euro area. Using bank and sovereign 
CDS spreads for 2009-12, they document increasing spillovers (and potential contagion) before key 
financial market episodes and policy actions during the European sovereign debt crisis. In addition, 
they argue that the peripheral countries’ contribution to systemic risk is high before their bailouts but 
then decreases rapidly. Spillovers from sovereigns to banks, and vice versa, tend to increase during 
periods of turmoil, reflecting the close bank-sovereign link in the euro area.  
Farhi and Tirole (2017) develop a theoretical framework to assess the risk loop between banks 
and their respective sovereigns. They identify that a weak banking sector can negatively affect the 
level of sovereign indebtedness because of potential bailouts, which increase the stock of public debt. 
At the same time, a weak sovereign has a direct effect on the health of domestic banks because of 
their holdings of government debt. The magnitude of the effect depends on the extent of banks’ home 
bias in asset holdings. They also provide a rationale for externalizing the function of banking 
supervision (a key pillar in the structure of a banking union). Breckenfelder and Schwaab (2018) 
analyse the spillover effect between bank and sovereign risk in the euro area. In a multi-country 
framework, they provide evidence of the existence of a significant cross-border component in 
explaining the nexus between bank and sovereign distress. Cooper and Nikolov (2018) develop a 
model to evaluate the feedback loop between banks and sovereigns, while suggesting different 
remedies to break this negative nexus, including the imposition of capital requirements on sovereign 
exposures. Fratzscher and Rieth (2019) use CDS data for 2003-13 to explore the link between 
sovereign and bank default risk in the euro area. They find evidence of a two-way causality between 
adverse shocks at sovereign and bank level, with the sovereign distress being more relevant in 
explaining bank fragility than vice versa. The authors also confirm that bank bailouts lowered the level 
of credit risk in the banking system, whilst raising sovereign risk. Laeven (2019) assesses the elements 
of the EU post-crisis regulatory response to the sovereign-bank nexus, while suggesting the adoption 
of a holistic approach in order to avoid undesired consequences.  
Despite this recent literature on the sovereign-bank nexus and its determinants, there remains a 
void whereby no empirical studies have yet investigated the credibility of the new EU bank resolution 
regime in terms of financial market connections among sovereigns, banks and the corporate sector.  
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3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
We employ daily CDS data for European sovereigns and corporates (both financial and non-
financial), sourced from Datastream. As standardized products with pre-specified and comparable 
terms, CDS contracts allow for a reliable comparison of credit risk across corporates and sovereigns 
(Breckenfelder and Schwaab, 2018). Specifically, 5-year CDS mid-quotes on senior unsecured debt 
contracts are selected, because this type of contract is commonly considered to be the most liquid 
and to represent the largest share of the CDS market (Ballester et al., 2016; Black et al., 2016). The 
restructuring clause is the full-restructuring credit event (CR) for the sovereign entities and the 
modified-modified restructuring (MM) clause for the non-sovereign entities, which correspond to the 
standard (and, therefore, most liquid) conditions for CDS contracts traded on European reference 
entities (Bedendo et al., 2015).9 The sample period spans from July 2011 to June 2018, which enables 
symmetric periods before and after the most crucial date in the establishment of the BRRD regime.  
There is a lack of discussion about CDS data in many previous research papers using European 
data. Mayordomo et al. (2014) compare five main databases for CDS prices, i.e. GFI, Fenics, Reuters, 
CMA and Markit. Using 5‐year CDS included in the European iTraxx and in the US CDX, they investigate 
the consistency across the data sources in both the cross-section and time series dimensions, for 2004-
10. They underline the existence of non-random deviations from the common trend across different 
datasets. Following a detailed investigation of different sources, our paper only employs data from 
Datastream in the interests of reliability and consistency.10 
Data selection for a given EU country is dependent on the existence of CDS prices for the 
sovereign and for at least two non-sovereign entities.11 The initial sample comprises CDS data on 196 
entities (142 non-financial and 54 financial).12 After excluding any series with missing observations, 
the resulting sample comprises 187 entities (133 non-financial and 54 financial) across 12 countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom). Observations from the UK account for 30% of the dataset, and France and 
Germany, around 19% and 18%, respectively.13  
                                                     
9 Any currency differences can be ignored as CDS data are expressed as a rate, thus without units (Ang and Longstaff, 
2013; Buchholz and Tonzer, 2016).  
10 We highlight the possibility of discrepancies among the price series provided by different data providers. This arises 
because CDS price data are collated from different contributors (e.g. brokers) based on their voluntary participation 
in periodic surveys. Leland (2009) reports that Bloomberg’s CDS data is often revised later and can differ substantially 
from other data sources such as Datastream. 
11 Finland, Ireland and Portugal are not included on a single basis, but only in the cross-country analysis, due to the 
limited CDS data either for non-financial or financial firms. Greece was not included in the sample due to its disrupted 
sovereign CDS data for 2012-13 (see Greenwood-Nimmo et al., 2019).  
12 The qualifying non-financial corporates are from the following sectors: (i) consumer goods; (ii) utilities; (iii) energy; 
(iv) manufacturing; (v) services; (vi) telecommunications; and (vii) transportation.  
13 To reduce the impact of outliers, both sovereign and non-sovereign CDS spreads are winsorized at the 1% level in 
each tail of the distribution. Moreover, in considering the relation between sovereign and non-sovereign CDS spreads, 
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Figure 1 presents the time series of sovereign and non-sovereign CDS spreads for nine of the 
selected countries over the entire sample period. More distressed countries, such as Italy and Spain, 
show higher (and more volatile) prices than the other countries. This is particularly evident during the 
most acute phase of the European debt crisis, i.e. between August 2011 and August 2012 (Ongena et 
al., 2016). Sovereign CDS spreads are visibly lower than the other two time series for all the other 
countries.  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for each CDS price series (sovereigns, banks and non-
financial corporates) for the full time period (Panel A) as well as for the pre-and post-BRRD periods 
(Panels B and C). There is considerable heterogeneity in the sample, both across time and across 
countries. Panel A shows that euro area peripheral countries demonstrate the highest average CDS 
spreads over the entire sample period. In contrast, the lowest average spreads are in Germany (16.93 
bps) and Sweden (17.58 bps). In the banking system, the average value for all the countries is above 
105 bps except for Sweden (73.40 bps). Average CDS prices for Irish and Portuguese banks are the 
highest. Finally, Italian non-financial companies have the highest average of daily CDS price (255.76 
bps), followed by Finnish and Spanish corporates (176.72 and 165.72 bps, respectively). A substantial 
reduction in the average values, for both sovereign and non-sovereign entities, is clear when 
comparing the data for pre- and post-BRRD implementation (Panels B and C of Table 1).  
3.2 Methodology 
To draw inference on the impact of the BRRD implementation on the CDS market and on the link 
between European banks and the respective sovereigns, we adopt a DiD estimation approach. The 
major assumption underlying the DiD methodology is that the average change in the outcome is 
expected to be the same for both the non-treated cohort and, counterfactually, for the treated cohort 
had the latter not participated. Unmeasured factors, such as changes in the economic environment, 
are therefore assumed to similarly affect both treated and non-treated entities (i.e. parallel trends 
assumption).  
These principles apply in our context in the following manner. In the absence of the treatment 
(BRRD), the behaviour of bank CDS (i.e. treatment group) would have evolved similarly to that of the 
non-financial corporate CDS (i.e. control group). Figure 2 displays the trend over the years 2011-14 
(pre-treatment period) for the average CDS spreads for banks, non-financial firms and related 
sovereigns. From a visual inspection, we infer that the parallel trends assumption holds since both the 
treated and untreated groups approximately exhibit a common trend in the absence of intervention.14 
                                                     
there were some instances when the former exceeds the latter. This condition is difficult to be economically justified, 
especially after investigating the associated issuer credit ratings. For the results reported in the paper, these specific 
price observations were considered to be missing.  
14 In order to further assess the plausibility of the parallel trend assumption, we conducted a placebo test employing 
a treatment group randomly selected from the control group. We found that the intervention did not have a significant 
impact on the “fake” treatment group, which supports the parallel trend assumption. 
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The main treatment (intervention) is represented by the BRRD which came into effect on 1st January 
2015. Moreover, an earlier intervention date (i.e. 15th May 2014 – the enactment date of the BRRD) 
has also been used in robustness tests.15 The entire data sample is drawn from European countries 
subject to BRRD requirements. We conduct the analysis on all the countries pooled together and on 
some specific groupings of countries.  
The model specification captures the effect of the intervention on the CDS market and on the 
sovereign-bank nexus. The following equation shows the baseline model: 
Equation 1 
GAPi,t = α0 + β1BRRDt + β2Treati + β3BRRDt ×  Treati + εi,t 
where GAPi,t is the difference, in price levels, between the non-sovereign CDS spreads and the 
sovereign CDS spreads (henceforth, “GAP”). i indexes the firm and t indicates time. BRRD and Treat 
are binary variables. BRRD represents the treatment and is equal to one from 1st January 2015 to 30th 
June 2018 and zero otherwise. Treat equals zero for the control group (i.e. non-financial corporates) 
and one for the treatment group (i.e. banks). α0 represents the level of GAP in the control group prior 
to the treatment. β1 captures any change in GAP in the control group following the BRRD 
implementation. β2 captures GAP differences between the treatment and control groups before the 
intervention. β3 represents the main coefficient of interest, because it captures the effect of the 
intervention on the treatment group. More specifically, it measures the difference in the GAP from 
the pre-treatment to the post-treatment period, between banks relative to non-financial corporates. 
A positive (negative) and statistically significant coefficient for β3would imply ceteris paribus that the 
GAP widens (narrows) more for banks than non-financial corporates.  
We augment our baseline equation into that considered as preferred, which includes a binary 
variable to control for the European sovereign debt crisis, a set of market-wide control variables and 
firm-specific fixed effects:  
Equation 2 
GAPi,t = 𝛼0 + β1BRRDt + β2BRRDt ×  Treati + 𝛽3𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝑋𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + εi,t 
Equation [2] subsumes the effect of Treat in the firm fixed effects (Cerqueiro et al., 2016). 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 
equals one between July 2011 and September 2012, and zero otherwise. 𝑋𝑡 accounts for market-wide 
factors, such as general business climate changes (e.g. Sclip et al., 2019), aggregate volatility (e.g. 
Annaert et al., 2013) and market-wide variations in CDS spreads (e.g. Acharya et al., 2014). Daily 
logarithmic returns for the Stoxx Europe 600 Index and the DS iTraxx Europe 5Y Index are included, as 
well as daily changes for the Vstoxx Index (these variables are added alternately to avoid collinearity 
                                                     
15 In addition, a further robustness test using a later intervention date of 1st January 2016 was conducted (with this 
date chosen because it was the required date for full implementation of the bail-in tool under the BRRD). The 
inferences are unaffected by this choice of date, hence only the results for two dates are presented in the paper. 
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issues).  𝛾𝑖  are firm fixed effects, which rule out the influence of unobserved firm specific differences 
constant over time. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm level to control for potential serial 
correlation within each panel.16 
The crisis period is defined as prior to 1st September 2012, which represents a date of 
compromise between the three key dates associated with the ECB Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT) program.17 Several authors (among others, Ferrando et al., 2015; Zaghini, 2016; Acharya et al., 
2017) acknowledge that the announcement of the OMT by the ECB in summer 2012 reduced tensions 
in both the euro area banking system and sovereign debt market. Announcement of the bond-buying 
program had an immediate positive impact in lowering spreads on sovereign bonds issued by 
distressed European countries. Many authors (e.g. Altavilla et al., 2016; Krishnamurthy et al., 2018) 
find that the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy reduced peripheral sovereign bond yields, 
particularly for countries such as Italy and Spain. The consequent increase in the value of these 
securities contributed to restoring the stability of the European banking system. The ECB’s 
intervention, which aimed to ease tensions and lowering the pricing of extreme risks (i.e. the collapse 
of the euro area), resulted in improved market access for both sovereigns and corporates from mid-
2012 (Zaghini, 2016). Fratzscher and Rieth (2019) consider the announcement of the OMT program to 
have been the most effective measure in reducing default risks in the euro area, both at sovereign and 
bank level. Finally, in order to add robustness to our results and inference, estimation of the preferred 
specification (Equation 2) is conducted using alternative data frequencies (i.e. daily, weekly and 
monthly).18 
4 Hypotheses  
Public rescues of troubled banks are a source of moral hazard and they undermine market 
discipline (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2018). Bailouts create expectations about 
future government responses to financial turmoil. More specifically, the subsidization of bank 
stakeholders’ risk-taking, through the externalization of the costs connected to failures, exerts a 
distorting effect on ex ante incentives. This could potentially create instability, fragility and risk in the 
banking sector (Hadjiemmanuil, 2017). Moreover, state-funded bailouts of insolvent banks produce a 
severe destabilizing effect on public finances and sovereign indebtedness.19 In order to overcome the 
                                                     
16 Moreover, country fixed effects are also considered in an alternative specification. A pertinent illustration of using 
such alternatives in a DiD framework can be found in Fiordelisi et al. (2017). The results presented in Section 5 are 
based on the preferred model specification (Equation 2).  
17 On 26th July 2012, the ECB President Draghi stated, during a conference in London, that the ECB was ready to do 
“Whatever it takes to preserve the Euro”. On 2nd August 2012, there was the announcement of the launch 
of the OMT Program, while its technical features were officially presented on 6th September 2012.  
18 In the interests of brevity, the results are presented in full for the daily frequency and partially for the weekly data 
frequency.  
19 During 2008-14, the direct fiscal costs associated with the banking crisis accounted for 4.8% of euro-area GDP (ECB, 
2015). 
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implicit principle of resolution, which characterized the crisis period and led to the privatization of 
banks’ profits and the socialization of their losses, there were two major responses at the European 
level. Firstly, based on the BRRD, a clear framework for dealing with failing banks was established, 
together with a central responsible resolution authority (i.e. the SRM). Secondly, the potential 
burdens of bank failure were realigned such that they would be borne by shareholders and 
bondholders, rather than by taxpayers. The bail-in concept was introduced with the intention of 
eliminating calls on the bailout mechanism (Benczur et al., 2017). 
The successful application of the new resolution rules requires that financial markets perceive 
them as credible and effective. If there is no confidence that a bank failure can be managed in an 
orderly fashion and market participants still expect a public bailout, the resolution procedure could 
lead to further turmoil. In this light, some authors (Avgouleas and Goodhart, 2015; Dell’Ariccia et al., 
2018) suggest that the bail-in mechanism might be inappropriate in the case of a systemic banking 
crisis. The bail-in approach might work better than bailout policies in the case of idiosyncratic distress, 
but not when there is a threat of systemic crisis or in the event of the collapse of a large cross-border 
European institution. Eventually, it might also intensify the potential systemic effect of a minor 
idiosyncratic turbulence (Navaretti et al., 2016). De Grauwe (2013) suggests that the new resolution 
framework could increase systemic risk in the euro area, thus making banking crises more likely, as a 
consequence of bank runs and large economic costs associated with the bail-in mechanism. The 
author emphasizes the negative effect of the bail-in provision on deposit holders.20  
In investigating whether the new bank resolution rules had an impact in weakening the doom 
loop between banks and sovereigns in Europe, the main hypothesis underlying our analysis is that the 
intervention is expected to impact the nexus in the case of banks, whereas the sovereign-corporate 
link should not be affected.21 The underlying assumption is that, a priori, the link between sovereigns 
and banks (regardless of the direction of causality) is considered as special compared to that between 
sovereigns and non-financial firms. Therefore, a lowering in the potency of the nexus between 
sovereign and bank risk, measured by CDS spreads, is anticipated. A relative widening of the GAP 
variable for banks, as described in Section 3.2, is expected if the BRRD is perceived as credible by 
market participants. A priori, we expect this to be especially evident in peripheral euro area countries. 
If the BRRD is not perceived as effective and reliable, the gap between bank and sovereign CDS spreads 
might, instead, be not significantly changed or decrease.  
                                                     
20 Under the BRRD, the bail-in of the most junior depositor class remains a possibility. Specifically, as per Moody’s 
(2015), the BRRD establishes a hierarchy in liquidation between different categories of deposits: those protected by 
deposit protection schemes (“covered deposits”, most senior), deposits by individuals and SMEs which are eligible for 
protection but exceed the maximum amounts (“eligible and uncovered”, second most senior) and finally other 
deposits, essentially from large corporates and institutions (junior deposits). 
21 In this context, it is worthwhile to mention that non-financial corporates with traded CDS are commonly large, blue-
chip companies, with relatively little reliance on the bank credit channel (Angelini et al., 2014).   
 11 
5 Empirical results 
This section provides results for the analysis conducted on the pooled sample of EU countries, as 
well as on a selected number of country sub-samples. This approach is motivated by the aim of better 
capturing and explaining the specific dynamics of economies with more homogenous features (e.g. 
euro area countries). The first stage of the investigation considers two alternative intervention dates, 
i.e. 15th May 2014 and 1st January 2015, and is conducted on both daily and weekly data frequencies. 
This enables the selection of the most relevant intervention date and ensures that potential illiquidity 
noise in the daily CDS market data does not influence the main findings.  
Panel A of Table 2 displays the estimation results for the preferred model specification (Equation 
2), for daily data, when adopting 1st of January 2015 as the treatment date. In all cases, the coefficient 
on the main variable of interest (i.e. 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷 𝑥 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡) is negative and with a marginal statistical 
significance at the 10% level. This evidence suggests a more pronounced narrowing in the GAP variable 
for banks than for non-financial corporates (following the intervention). Therefore, in contrast to the 
prior expectations, it seems that market participants did not assess the implementation of the BRRD 
as credible in loosening the negative loop between sovereign and bank risk across Europe. Accounting 
for firm fixed effects adds robustness to the evidence, while supporting the idea of a relatively wide 
heterogeneity across corporates. In contrast, heterogeneity across countries initially appears to be 
more limited. The crisis episode has a meaningful effect in explaining the variation in the dependent 
variable, confirming the strong impact that the European sovereign debt crisis had on both the real 
economy and financial markets. The control variables included in the specification, with the aim of 
accounting for market-wide variations, have no substantive impact on the main findings of interest.  
Panel B of Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients, for daily data, when adopting 15th May 
2014, the BRRD enactment date, as alternative intervention date. In this setting, the coefficient on the 
variable measuring the DiD effect (i.e. 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷 𝑥 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡) maintains a negative sign, which is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This evidence confirms a narrowing in the dependent variable GAP which 
is more marked in the banking sector than in the non-financial sector. These results confirm the 
presence of a relatively high level of heterogeneity across firms and the influence of the crisis episode. 
Overall, the evidence from employing an alternative intervention date does not diverge substantially 
to that arising when using the originally selected intervention date.22  
In order to account for any liquidity noise in the price data, a similar empirical strategy is adopted 
on weekly data. Results for the estimation employing the two alternative, but related, intervention 
                                                     
22 To reinforce the selection of the original intervention date, we conducted a further falsification test and repeated 
the DiD estimation with a later alternative intervention date, i.e. 1st January 2016. The results do not indicate a 
significant DiD effect for the treated group relative to the control group. This evidence also rules out the possibility 
that the significant change in the outcome of interest was driven solely by the introduction of the bail-in tool, whose 
provision under the BRRD came fully into force on 1st January 2016. In the interests of brevity, this set of results is  not 
reported in the paper. 
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dates are presented in Panels C and D of Table 2. No specific evidence of illiquidity is revealed and the 
results are consistent for the alternative data frequencies. Moreover, no significant divergences are 
highlighted when using the two intervention dates. Based on this evidence, and to avoid repetition, 
the remaining reported results reflect the use of daily data and the adoption of 1st January 2015 as 
the treatment date.   
In reflecting on the above findings, it is possible to identify several potential reasons for a clear 
divergence from our prior expectations. Firstly, weakening the sovereign-bank risk nexus could be 
limited by the fact that most EU banks still held large amounts of their own sovereign debt. As of June 
2015, according to the EBA EU-wide transparency exercise, EU banks held €2.3tn in government debt 
and 65% of these exposures were to domestic sovereigns. The latter home bias problem represents a 
crucial obstacle to the implementation of a EDIS, which is a fundamental step towards weakening the 
sovereign-bank nexus and completing the BU. Therefore, revisiting the regulatory (preferential) 
treatment of sovereign exposures and the related concentration limits, with the final aim of avoiding 
large-scale public bailouts, is central to the policy debate (Andritzky et al., 2016).23 From this 
perspective, the more comprehensive approach suggested in Laeven (2019) could enable a more 
thorough weakening of the sovereign-bank nexus.  
Moreover, some flexibility in the use of the bail-in tool with the aim of preserving financial 
stability, as established under the BRRD and the EU norms on state aid, might entail sufficient political 
influence such as to threaten the credibility of the resolution mechanism.24 Thus, discretionary 
exceptions should be permitted only under extraordinary and precisely defined conditions (Buch, 
2016). The scope for interpretation should be reduced in order to avoid legal uncertainty and to 
ensure the effectiveness of the resolution framework (Philippon and Salord, 2017).  
In Moody’s (2015) view, national deviations from the EU-BRRD led to a more complex and 
fragmented framework able to delay the process of resolving banks, while making the outcomes less 
predictable for market participants.25 In addition, there was a significant delay in the implementation 
of the BRRD across countries. As of June 2015, while the BRRD should have entered in force from 
January 2015, some of the selected EU countries were still transposing it into national law (e.g. France, 
Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden).26 A potential effect of such a delay is the risk that a bank failure 
in a country where the BRRD is not fully implemented might result in a conflict between EU and 
national law, with an associated high legal risk.  
                                                     
23 Positive risk weights would tackle counterparty credit risk, while large exposure limits would tackle concentration 
risk. Proposals about the subjection of banks’ sovereign exposures to capital requirements and/or large exposure 
limits were examined by the ECOFIN in April 2016.  
24 On the state aid rules to support measures in favour of banks, see the 2013 EC “Banking Communication”.  
25 Germany and Italy, for instance, have modified the BRRD script by supplementing the hierarchy that defines which 
asset classes suffer the first losses in the case of a bank failure (Moody’s, 2016).  
26 Refer to the ISDA BRRD Implementation Monitor (http://www2.isda.org/isda-brrd-implementation-monitor/).  
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Another consequence, which negatively affects investors, arises from the persistent uncertainty 
about the insolvency hierarchies that apply in the case of a bank failure. According to Fitch (2016), the 
use of exemptions can lead to more complex resolutions due to increased legal risk and compensation 
costs. Indeed, under the BRRD, in exceptional circumstances the resolution authority can 
discretionally decide to exclude, fully or partially, certain instruments from the bail-in, based on their 
maturities and/or holders. The lack of an EU standard defining this exceptionality might imply different 
interpretations of these options across different jurisdictions. The possibility that bail-in cases would 
proceed heterogeneously in each EU Member State represents a potential source of uncertainty for 
market participants, while raising the cost of banks’ funding (Huertas, 2016). As Fitch (2016) reports, 
bailing-in senior liabilities with a retail investor base might result in a difficult and politically sensitive 
task for resolution authorities. The prospect of unequal treatment of creditors within the same class 
can lead to significant legal consequences, as observed in the cases of Portuguese Banco Espirito Santo 
and four small Italian banks at the end of 2015.27  
In addition, in a weak banking context characterized by widespread distress, the bail-in of a single 
institution may induce other banks’ claimholders to review their positions, with a consequent “flight-
to-quality” effect. This, in turn, might imply a significant increase in the cost of funding for the whole 
banking sector (Hadjiemmanuil, 2017). Together with potential contagion arising from market 
reactions, the more direct transmission channel of losses from the resolved bank and other 
institutions holding bail-inable liabilities would also be relevant. In fact, losses experienced by those 
institutions could harm their own viability, along with inducing negative effects for the entire financial 
system (Hüser et al., 2018).  
Finally, the BRRD came into force during a period of high fragmentation of the EU banking system, 
and more generally of the euro area, as a consequence of the sovereign debt crisis. A common 
framework applied to markedly different contexts, characterized by different backgrounds and legal 
systems, could increase divergence across countries.28  
 
 
                                                     
27 Regarding the Italian case, Ignazio Visco (Governor of the Bank of Italy) stated that when the bail-in mechanism is 
not adequate to achieve resolution goals and there are threats to financial stability, the possibility of public support 
might not be ruled out. Specifically, the confidence in the whole banking sector was weakened by the write-down of 
subordinated debt held by retail customers and the associated national media coverage. This, in turn, resulted in 
deposit outflows from weaker banks in late 2015 and early 2016 (Visco, 2016).  
28 In December 2017, the European Court of Auditors reported that the Single Resolution Board (SRB) is still a work in 
progress and has been required to take on considerable responsibilities in a short span of time. According to SNL, the 
auditors also outlined shortcomings in the SRB's contingency plans for bank resolution and made a number of 
recommendations relating to the agency's rules, guidance and preparation on resolving failing banks. 
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5.1 Evidence from sub-samples of countries 
In order to reveal more detailed insights on market perceptions of the effectiveness of the BRRD, 
we analyse a number of country sub-samples. The underlying rationale is to investigate the market 
dynamics for groups of economies which have well-defined aspects of commonality. For this purpose, 
we report results for countries in three main categories, i.e. (i) euro area core countries; (ii) euro area 
peripheral countries; and (iii) large European countries (Tables 3, 4 and 5). Within these three 
categories, we subsequently deepen our investigation by considering further differentiations, i.e. (i) 
large/small euro area core countries; (ii) Italy and Spain on a separate basis; and (iii) large euro 
area/non-euro area countries.  
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results for the analysis on the euro area core countries (defined as 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Netherlands). The estimated coefficient on the 
variable of interest (i.e. 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷 𝑥 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡) is positive for all the specifications, but with no statistical 
significance. The contribution of the crisis event is always positive and statistically significant. The high 
degree of heterogeneity across firms is again confirmed. The focus on the large euro area core 
economies (Panel B of Table 3) reveals a negative, relatively small and non-significant coefficient of 
interest for all the model specifications. A different scenario, albeit not statistically significant, is 
presented in Panel C of Table 3. When considering small euro area core countries, i.e. Austria, Belgium 
and Finland, the coefficient on the main variable of interest is positive and large in magnitude. 
Moreover, the crisis event does not appear as having a significant contribution and cross-country 
heterogeneity assumes a more prominent role in explaining the variability in the dependent variable.  
The investigation proceeds by focusing on the group of euro area peripheral economies (i.e. 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Panel A of Table 4 displays the findings for the estimation covering 
the entire sub-sample of peripheral euro area countries. The main coefficient of interest (for 
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷 𝑥 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡) is always negative, but with no statistical significance. A relatively high cross-country 
heterogeneity is highlighted and the crisis episode positively contributes in explaining the variability 
in the GAP. Focusing on the two peripheral countries with larger data samples, Panel B of Table 4 
presents the findings for Italy, while Panel C reports those for Spain. The estimated coefficient on the 
variable 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷 𝑥 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 is positive (15.572 bps) and highly statistically significant for Italy. This 
evidence suggests that the implementation of the BRRD was perceived by the markets as beneficial in 
weakening the nexus between Italian banks and their government. Indeed, a widening of the GAP 
variable implies a potential reduction in the potency of the interaction between sovereign and bank 
risk (consistent with our main hypothesis). The Italian banking system, hampered by a large volume 
of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs), i.e. €360bn at the end of 2015, and numerous fragile banks, thus 
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represents a unique case.29 The reduced likelihood for these banks to be rescued could logically be 
captured in a widening of the gap between bank and sovereign CDS spreads. Results for Spain (Panel 
C of Table 4) reveal a large and negative coefficient on the main variable of interest, significant at the 
5% level. This evidence indicates that market participants did not evaluate the BRRD as effective in 
loosening the sovereign-bank nexus for Spain. The crisis episode does not appear to have a meaningful 
contribution in the Italian context, yet for Spain seems to assume a very substantial role.   
The last stage of the analysis begins with a focus on large European countries (i.e. France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom). Subsequently, we differentiate 
between large euro area countries (i.e. France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain) and large non-
euro area countries (i.e. Sweden and United Kingdom). Table 5 reports the related findings, split across 
three different panels. Panel A shows that the coefficient on the main variable of interest (i.e. 
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷 𝑥 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡) is negative for all the specifications and statistically significant at 5% level. This 
evidence indicates an overall lack of credibility in the effect of the BRRD in weakening the 
interconnection between sovereign and bank risk. More specifically, it seems that the implementation 
of the BRRD led to a more marked narrowing in the GAP variable for banks than for non-financial firms 
in these countries. The findings also highlight a positive and strongly significant contribution of the 
crisis event. Cross-country heterogeneity does not appear to have a substantial contribution in 
explaining the variability in the dependent variable. 
On turning attention to large euro area countries only (Panel B of Table 5), the estimated 
coefficients still suggest a lack of influence and lack of statistical significance associated with the BRRD 
implementation. The crisis event still holds its positive significance. Finally, the investigation on large 
European, but non-euro area countries, namely Sweden and United Kingdom, underpins what could 
be considered as a counter-intuitive result, to some extent. It appears that these countries are driving 
the results for the whole sub-group of large European countries. The coefficient on the main variable 
of interest (Panel C, Table 5) is negative and highly statistically significant for all the specifications.30  
 
 
                                                     
29 See Garrido et al. (2016). The Italian government has implemented various reforms to address the issue of high 
levels of NPLs, including state-backed guarantees on senior tranches of securitized bad loans (so-called “GACS”) and 
the creation of two Atlante funds with the aim of supporting capital raising and acquisition of mezzanine and equity 
tranches in securitization of bad loans.  
30 A possible interpretation of these findings, particularly related to the UK, resides in the substantial uncertainty 
related to the Brexit referendum vote. This led to extensive concerns on financial markets and for investors holding 
bank bonds. For instance, the exit of the UK from the EU creates uncertainty regarding the eligibility of bonds issued, 
under UK law, for MREL purposes. 
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6 Conclusions 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of the new European bank resolution 
regime on the sovereign-bank nexus. Did financial market participants evaluate the bank resolution 
framework as an effective mechanism to weaken the link between sovereign and bank risk in Europe? 
Drawing evidence from the CDS market, for the period 2011-18, we used a previously unexplored 
natural experiment to test the effectiveness and credibility of the BRRD. We employed a DiD 
estimation approach where the treatment group consists of European banks, whilst the control group 
is composed of European non-financial corporates. Furthermore, in order to better capture potentially 
different market dynamics, the same empirical strategy was applied to sub-groups of countries.  
The main findings, which are robust in various model specifications, did not indicate any 
significant weakening in the nexus between bank and sovereign CDS spreads, compared to the 
corresponding evidence for the European non-financial sector. Contrary to prior anticipation, an 
overall narrowing of the gap between bank and sovereign risk, as reflected in CDS prices, was evident. 
Italy was the only case where the CDS market seems to have perceived the implementation of the 
BRRD as effective in weakening the sovereign-bank nexus. According to the new resolution regime, a 
reduced probability to be publicly rescued for the Italian banks, overwhelmed by large stocks of NPLs, 
could be reflected in this widening of the gap between bank and sovereign CDS spreads. With 
hindsight, this market perception seems misplaced and over-optimistic given more recent events in 
the Italian banking sector. 
The overall lack of confidence about the potential for the new bank resolution rules to weaken 
the sovereign-bank nexus might arise from multiple factors. Firstly, the persistent strong exposures of 
EU banks to their own sovereign debt. Moreover, the presence of several “ambiguous” provisions 
under the BRRD, which confer considerable discretion on the supervisory and resolution authorities, 
might entail sufficient political influence such as to undermine the credibility of the BRRD 
(Hadjiemmanuil, 2017). The bail-in provision does not completely remove the possibility of the 
injection of public funds where there is a threat of systemic distress or in the case of the collapse of a 
large cross-border European bank (Avgouleas and Goodhart, 2015). Debt holders of Global 
Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) and other institutions considered as relevant in the domestic 
markets might continue to benefit from a moderate probability of public support (Moody’s, 2015). 
Finally, a weak European banking environment, hampered by extensive volumes of NPLs and low 
profitability, might entail the risk of reigniting the strong sovereign-bank link that characterized the 
sovereign debt crisis (Enria, 2017).  
In sum, the reforms and policy initiatives adopted in response to both the financial and sovereign 
debt crises provided a robust framework to address the failure of banks across Europe. In this context, 
the shift from the reliance on taxpayers’ money to explicitly imposing losses on the banks’ 
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shareholders and (unsecured) creditors represented a crucial change. However, as highlighted in 
various recent contributions (e.g. Enria, 2016; Laeven, 2019), additional reforms (e.g. creating both a 
common fiscal backstop and a common deposit insurance scheme, limiting banks’ exposures to 
sovereign debt) must be implemented in order to further improve the resilience of the European 
financial system, while enhancing the consistency of the new regulatory framework. Indeed, some 
distance remains before achieving a situation characterized by feasible and credible plans in place to 
ensure an adequate level of comfort in terms of preparation for dealing with future crises (Enria, 
2016). Removing embedded impediments to effective and successful resolution procedures is not 
immediately possible and the transition phase to a truly effective new regime poses significant 
challenges. Nevertheless, adhering to its key principles is essential to avoid uncertainty among market 
participants, ensure predictability and reduce deviations from the long-term objectives of the new 
institutional framework. As stated in Philippon and Salord (2017, p.41), “the old system had such a 
strong preference for forbearance that simply doing better is not enough”. From this perspective, 
credibility for market participants is therefore crucial. This paper offers original insights which 
contribute to the policy debate.  
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Table 1 - Descriptive statistics for the CDS price series 
Panel A - Full sample period (July 2011 - June 2018)      
 Obs. Min Max Mean Median 5th Pct 95th Pct Std.Dev. 
Sovereigns 
Austria 1826 6.47 159.23 31.39 18.09 7.54 116.88 34.18 
Belgium 1826 8.37 341.98 54.60 31.87 9.28 215.28 64.82 
Germany 1826 5.00 79.29 16.93 12.12 5.09 56.89 15.00 
Spain 1826 17.71 492.07 132.82 74.34 25.54 373.68 113.79 
Finland 1826 9.64 87.24 29.68 23.51 10.86 75.57 18.25 
France 1826 7.15 171.56 40.79 27.86 7.92 128.58 35.85 
Ireland 1826 11.43 1191.16 154.57 47.25 14.50 688.88 223.34 
Italy 1826 42.04 498.66 160.45 110.02 57.78 411.17 108.20 
Netherlands 1826 8.66 133.84 38.68 25.49 10.16 112.02 30.73 
Portugal 1826 38.29 1521.45 340.46 208.67 49.24 1103.81 328.28 
Sweden 1826 5.64 75.71 17.58 12.04 6.61 53.34 14.35 
United Kingdom 1826 10.76 94.99 32.10 26.42 13.24 75.19 18.26 
Banks 
Austria 1826 73.61 403.51 165.65 146.51 98.65 310.23 60.50 
Belgium 1826 21.22 391.67 111.90 71.45 24.39 275.60 84.52 
Germany 1826 54.25 358.38 131.62 107.50 65.46 272.15 63.65 
Spain 1826 51.56 741.07 239.07 135.15 94.62 654.22 186.33 
Finland         
France 1826 27.55 361.39 114.87 76.83 31.60 282.32 78.80 
Ireland 1826 35.27 2298.98 346.52 170.71 36.11 1211.86 396.92 
Italy 1826 111.50 662.25 253.58 203.99 122.21 543.57 131.51 
Netherlands 1826 104.20 297.58 156.64 138.36 107.27 255.21 46.83 
Portugal 1826 88.81 1875.50 526.53 427.64 102.03 1509.13 381.04 
Sweden 1826 19.30 218.60 73.40 61.32 21.85 166.55 42.91 
United Kingdom 1826 41.85 309.98 107.86 83.96 44.83 252.02 63.90 
Non-financial corporates 
Austria 1826 26.58 197.76 88.35 69.59 30.67 161.84 43.38 
Belgium 1826 39.63 251.21 90.23 77.94 44.63 179.58 42.00 
Germany 1826 44.83 363.02 116.80 90.41 50.51 286.42 67.97 
Spain 1826 63.52 557.07 165.72 119.07 70.43 397.80 106.76 
Finland 1826 71.36 427.78 176.72 128.96 78.41 368.69 100.40 
France 1826 64.64 326.62 138.20 109.29 71.15 278.07 66.89 
Ireland         
Italy 1826 91.58 632.95 255.76 203.40 112.74 530.68 126.41 
Netherlands 1826 53.46 239.27 109.52 90.54 60.46 201.51 44.72 
Portugal         
Sweden 1826 79.75 202.05 111.15 105.04 84.71 169.64 23.93 








Table 1 – Continued 
Panel B - Pre-BRRD period (July 2011 - Dec. 2014)      
 Obs. Min Max Mean Median 5th Pct 95th Pct Std.Dev. 
Sovereigns 
Austria 914 12.18 159.23 48.52 24.15 14.02 126.37 41.58 
Belgium 914 21.53 341.98 86.81 40.28 25.06 253.35 78.91 
Germany 914 7.77 79.29 25.30 16.33 9.75 62.44 17.35 
Spain 914 45.42 492.07 210.73 212.21 54.73 410.95 115.27 
Finland 914 18.55 87.24 39.56 28.78 20.28 79.20 21.11 
France 914 21.03 171.56 62.68 41.67 26.67 142.54 39.40 
Ireland 914 35.72 1191.16 275.31 133.99 40.19 791.98 265.18 
Italy 914 69.25 498.66 230.07 211.37 83.89 442.63 114.85 
Netherlands 914 18.33 133.84 59.48 51.46 21.52 119.24 31.48 
Portugal 914 129.40 1521.45 533.39 384.13 145.40 1179.82 369.91 
Sweden 914 7.65 75.71 24.33 15.75 8.18 58.04 17.62 
United Kingdom 914 16.91 94.99 41.69 37.67 18.65 82.50 20.50 
Banks 
Austria 914 114.49 403.51 199.55 172.10 131.16 345.94 67.48 
Belgium 914 55.53 391.67 170.71 139.27 70.27 332.49 83.83 
Germany 914 84.18 358.38 172.28 150.01 87.99 303.05 67.03 
Spain 914 87.81 741.07 357.36 338.24 98.93 666.08 201.99 
Finland         
France 914 56.79 361.39 168.33 160.01 62.49 300.97 79.47 
Ireland 914 145.06 2298.98 567.08 378.95 157.88 1442.72 462.87 
Italy 914 116.81 662.25 335.57 357.95 131.04 561.37 139.61 
Netherlands 914 109.92 297.58 188.06 186.39 121.24 268.45 47.05 
Portugal 914 156.12 1875.50 681.15 516.52 206.13 1578.89 444.57 
Sweden 914 45.30 218.60 99.95 85.95 47.15 180.84 44.19 
United Kingdom 914 50.78 309.98 148.09 131.63 60.64 262.78 67.50 
Non-financial corporates 
Austria 914 59.67 197.76 122.98 127.54 64.14 170.77 33.55 
Belgium 914 49.29 251.21 112.58 111.62 57.71 204.45 43.67 
Germany 914 70.37 363.02 159.76 143.74 78.01 303.17 72.16 
Spain 914 73.01 557.07 233.81 225.58 84.80 438.46 113.28 
Finland 914 97.73 427.78 253.60 265.88 129.71 381.35 89.52 
France 914 80.39 326.62 181.74 178.10 87.81 290.85 68.35 
Ireland         
Italy 914 156.83 632.95 346.59 339.09 179.11 574.69 117.51 
Netherlands 914 79.68 239.27 143.21 146.22 85.20 209.08 39.70 
Portugal         
Sweden 914 79.75 202.05 117.67 107.29 83.71 179.44 29.68 








Table 1 – Continued 
Panel C - Post-BRRD period (Jan. 2015 - June 2018)      
 Obs. Min Max Mean Median 5th Pct 95th Pct Std.Dev. 
Sovereigns 
Austria 912 6.47 23.04 14.22 15.92 7.27 19.50 4.30 
Belgium 912 8.37 45.96 22.32 23.26 8.91 35.82 9.63 
Germany 912 5.00 15.56 8.54 7.77 5.09 13.50 2.88 
Spain 912 17.71 105.03 54.74 59.52 21.02 83.03 20.76 
Finland 912 9.64 29.95 19.78 21.02 10.14 25.98 4.93 
France 912 7.15 37.73 18.85 19.92 7.72 31.26 7.57 
Ireland 912 11.43 70.23 33.56 37.32 11.70 51.32 12.90 
Italy 912 42.04 140.50 90.67 92.33 51.28 125.88 22.32 
Netherlands 912 8.66 31.94 17.84 16.43 9.43 26.48 5.50 
Portugal 912 38.29 286.38 147.11 142.94 44.39 237.61 63.09 
Sweden 912 5.64 20.30 10.81 10.07 6.29 16.25 3.12 
United Kingdom 912 10.76 46.38 22.49 20.84 12.38 36.60 7.86 
Banks 
Austria 912 73.61 173.69 131.69 141.04 95.00 158.66 21.47 
Belgium 912 21.22 93.27 52.96 60.00 22.71 73.73 17.93 
Germany 912 54.25 126.90 90.87 94.53 58.72 113.44 17.08 
Spain 912 51.56 190.33 120.52 122.93 89.24 156.80 23.58 
Finland         
France 912 27.55 117.54 61.29 68.57 29.09 84.71 19.20 
Ireland 912 35.27 199.62 125.49 147.87 35.30 186.93 56.31 
Italy 912 111.50 291.87 171.42 159.97 118.22 240.74 40.16 
Netherlands 912 104.20 160.67 125.15 127.12 105.06 145.30 13.85 
Portugal 912 88.81 829.09 371.58 307.22 94.77 767.04 211.59 
Sweden 912 19.30 92.74 46.80 50.98 20.69 73.79 17.78 
United Kingdom 912 41.85 121.33 67.55 65.74 43.57 103.52 19.07 
Non-financial corporates 
Austria 912 26.58 96.08 53.65 56.13 28.62 74.06 15.29 
Belgium 912 39.63 186.32 67.83 64.30 43.21 110.70 24.88 
Germany 912 44.83 138.00 73.73 73.14 48.87 105.80 18.11 
Spain 912 63.52 198.27 97.47 95.83 68.46 139.99 25.67 
Finland 912 71.36 172.09 99.66 98.49 75.15 127.38 16.88 
France 912 64.64 175.09 94.58 94.20 69.51 134.01 21.79 
Ireland         
Italy 912 91.58 290.82 164.73 165.98 107.92 231.63 40.02 
Netherlands 912 53.46 112.03 75.76 76.54 57.39 95.47 12.13 
Portugal         
Sweden 912 80.78 153.11 104.61 103.01 85.27 126.77 13.39 
United Kingdom 912 82.75 143.44 102.50 99.95 85.37 126.03 13.04 
Description: The table reports the descriptive statistics (expressed in bps) for sovereign CDS, bank CDS and non-financial 
corporate CDS (daily data). For each group, the following metrics are reported: the number of observations (Obs.), the 
minimum (Min), the maximum (Max), the mean (Mean), the median (Median), the 5th and 95th percentiles (5th Pct and 
95th Pct, respectively) and the standard deviation (Std.Dev.). Panel A provides the statistics for the full sample period 
(July 2011 – June 2018), Panel B for the pre-BRRD period (July 2011 – Dec. 2014) and Panel C for the post-BRRD period 
(Jan. 2015 – June 2018). 
Note: CDS data for Finnish banks, and Irish and Portuguese non-financial firms, were either not available or incomplete.  
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Table 2 - The impact of BRRD on the sovereign-bank nexus for all the selected EU-countries 




   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
BRRD -19.545*** -19.921*** -19.536*** -19.924*** -19.545*** -19.932*** -19.564*** -19.952*** 
  (7.155) (7.153) (7.155) (7.153) (7.156) (7.153) (7.157) (7.155) 
BRRD x Treat -19.861* -18.333* -19.951* -18.388* -19.949* -18.386* -19.951* -18.388* 
  (10.690) (10.705) (10.690) (10.705) (10.690) (10.705) (10.690) (10.705) 
Crisis 48.326*** 53.379*** 49.044*** 54.431*** 49.086*** 54.478*** 48.990*** 54.377*** 
  (6.993) (7.283) (7.029) (7.336) (7.033) (7.341) (7.025) (7.332) 
Treat   10.275   10.162   10.160   10.162 
    (12.995)   (13.003)   (13.003)   (13.003) 
ITRAXX     -0.185*** -0.188***         
      (0.028) (0.029)         
STOXX600         0.693*** 0.724***     
          (0.089) (0.092)     
VSTOXX             -0.094*** -0.093*** 
              (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant 99.328*** 95.542*** 99.430*** 95.633*** 99.427*** 95.630*** 99.474*** 95.677*** 
  (2.352) (8.623) (2.353) (8.625) (2.354) (8.625) (2.355) (8.628) 
Obs. 334,144 334,144 333,568 333,568 333,568 333,568 333,568 333,568 
R-squared 0.631 0.089 0.632 0.090 0.632 0.090 0.632 0.090 
Firm FE YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Country FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
BRRD -29.108*** -29.584*** -29.103*** -29.597*** -29.102*** -29.595*** -29.115*** -29.610*** 
  (7.780) (7.787) (7.780) (7.788) (7.780) (7.789) (7.782) (7.790) 
BRRD x Treat -27.613** -25.222** -27.672** -25.201** -27.669** -25.198** -27.672** -25.201** 
  (11.814) (11.876) (11.813) (11.877) (11.814) (11.878) (11.813) (11.877) 
Crisis 37.133*** 42.319*** 37.842*** 43.368*** 37.890*** 43.420*** 37.805*** 43.330*** 
  (6.403) (6.687) (6.438) (6.738) (6.442) (6.743) (6.436) (6.736) 
Treat   16.000   15.844   15.842   15.844 
    (14.334)   (14.343)   (14.343)   (14.343) 
ITRAXX     -0.138*** -0.141***         
      (0.026) (0.026)         
STOXX600         0.597*** 0.630***     
          (0.082) (0.085)     
VSTOXX             -0.067*** -0.066*** 
              (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant 110.409*** 104.852*** 110.507*** 104.947*** 110.498*** 104.938*** 110.535*** 104.976*** 
  (3.066) (9.736) (3.068) (9.740) (3.068) (9.740) (3.070) (9.743) 
Obs. 334,144 334,144 333,568 333,568 333,568 333,568 333,568 333,568 
R-squared 0.642 0.099 0.642 0.100 0.642 0.100 0.642 0.100 
Firm FE YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Country FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
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Table 2 - Continued 
Panel C: Preferred model specification - 01/01/15 intervention date - weekly data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
BRRD -19.554*** -19.904*** -19.546*** -19.910*** -19.534*** -19.896*** -19.598*** -19.965*** 
 (7.148) (7.147) (7.138) (7.136) (7.142) (7.141) (7.151) (7.149) 
BRRD x Treat -19.676* -18.216* -19.754* -18.216* -19.742* -18.205* -19.753* -18.215* 
 (10.692) (10.712) (10.701) (10.718) (10.702) (10.719) (10.701) (10.718) 
Crisis 45.941*** 50.076*** 47.066*** 51.728*** 47.351*** 52.031*** 46.991*** 51.646*** 
 (6.851) (7.091) (6.913) (7.182) (6.936) (7.208) (6.901) (7.169) 
Treat  10.610  10.338  10.330  10.337 
  (12.976)  (12.995)  (12.996)  (12.996) 
ITRAXX   -0.086*** -0.088**     
   (0.033) (0.034)     
STOXX600     0.571*** 0.602***   
     (0.100) (0.104)   
VSTOXX       -0.097*** -0.094*** 
       (0.013) (0.014) 
Constant 99.047*** 95.276*** 99.195*** 95.424*** 99.140*** 95.367*** 99.294*** 95.524*** 
 (2.349) (8.616) (2.341) (8.615) (2.342) (8.611) (2.352) (8.625) 
         
Obs. 67,095 67,095 66,910 66,910 66,910 66,910 66,910 66,910 
R-squared 0.632 0.085 0.633 0.087 0.633 0.087 0.633 0.087 
Firm FE YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Country FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Panel D: Preferred model specification - 14/05/14 intervention date - weekly data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
BRRD -34.652*** -35.170*** -34.749*** -35.309*** -34.649*** -35.204*** -34.690*** -35.256*** 
 (8.450) (8.462) (8.444) (8.458) (8.444) (8.458) (8.455) (8.469) 
BRRD x Treat -31.551** -29.142** -31.588** -29.025** -31.571** -29.008** -31.585** -29.022** 
 (12.720) (12.792) (12.737) (12.815) (12.739) (12.817) (12.737) (12.815) 
Crisis 27.138*** 31.397*** 28.067*** 32.852*** 28.460*** 33.266*** 28.157*** 32.932*** 
 (5.900) (6.137) (5.945) (6.207) (5.970) (6.235) (5.944) (6.205) 
Treat  20.242  19.895  19.883  19.893 
  (15.292)  (15.324)  (15.325)  (15.324) 
ITRAXX   0.002 -0.001     
   (0.031) (0.032)     
STOXX600     0.454*** 0.485***   
     (0.094) (0.099)   
VSTOXX       -0.058*** -0.055*** 














 (3.758) (10.626) (3.751) (10.633) (3.749) (10.625) (3.764) (10.640) 
         
Obs. 67,095 67,095 66,910 66,910 66,910 66,910 66,910 66,910 
R-squared 0.647 0.100 0.648 0.102 0.648 0.102 0.648 0.102 
Firm FE YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Country FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Description: The table reports the results for the preferred DiD estimation applied on the 12 selected EU-countries 
together. The dependent variable is the GAP (i.e. difference between non-sovereign CDS and sovereign CDS spreads) 
calculated on both daily (Panels A and B) and weekly data (Panels C and D) and expressed in bps. Two alternative 
intervention dates are employed. Firm and country fixed effects are included alternatively. Robust standard errors, 
clustered at firm level, are reported in parentheses.  
Note: The crisis dummy takes the value one from 1st July 2011 to 1st September 2012, zero otherwise. 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
 27 
Table 3 - The impact of BRRD on the sovereign-bank nexus: Euro area core countries 
Panel A: Preferred model specification - Euro area core countries  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
BRRD -39.273*** -39.861*** -39.290*** -39.911*** -39.299*** -39.919*** -39.323*** -39.944*** 
 (11.393) (11.392) (11.392) (11.390) (11.393) (11.392) (11.396) (11.395) 
BRRD x Treat 5.476 7.635 5.648 7.911 5.652 7.915 5.647 7.910 
 (15.883) (15.967) (15.888) (15.977) (15.889) (15.977) (15.888) (15.977) 
Crisis 58.843*** 63.763*** 59.538*** 64.707*** 59.600*** 64.774*** 59.475*** 64.643*** 
 (10.864) (11.517) (10.913) (11.598) (10.920) (11.606) (10.907) (11.591) 
Treat  6.259  5.971  5.968  5.972 
  (20.281)  (20.301)  (20.301)  (20.301) 
ITRAXX   -0.220*** -0.224***     
   (0.042) (0.043)     
STOXX600     0.885*** 0.931***   
     (0.147) (0.152)   
VSTOXX       -0.118*** -0.117*** 
       (0.015) (0.015) 
Constant 109.146*** 106.923*** 109.169*** 106.985*** 109.164*** 106.979*** 109.223*** 107.039*** 
 (3.801) (12.421) (3.800) (12.423) (3.801) (12.422) (3.805) (12.428) 
         
Obs. 174,064 174,064 173,904 173,904 173,904 173,904 173,904 173,904 
R-squared 0.596 0.109 0.596 0.111 0.596 0.111 0.596 0.111 
Firm FE YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Country FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Panel B: Preferred model specification - Large euro area core countries  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
BRRD -31.788*** -32.437*** -31.826*** -32.513*** -31.833*** -32.520*** -31.855*** -32.543*** 
 (11.857) (11.858) (11.857) (11.858) (11.858) (11.860) (11.862) (11.863) 
BRRD x Treat -3.460 -0.978 -3.204 -0.598 -3.200 -0.595 -3.205 -0.599 
 (17.057) (17.168) (17.071) (17.187) (17.071) (17.188) (17.070) (17.187) 
Crisis 59.082*** 64.583*** 59.756*** 65.537*** 59.816*** 65.602*** 59.700*** 65.479*** 
 (11.392) (12.174) (11.444) (12.268) (11.451) (12.277) (11.438) (12.262) 
Treat  7.933  7.575  7.572  7.576 
  (21.943)  (21.967)  (21.967)  (21.967) 
ITRAXX   -0.195*** -0.202***     
   (0.042) (0.044)     
STOXX600     0.813*** 0.862***   
     (0.148) (0.155)   
VSTOXX       -0.109*** -0.108*** 
       (0.015) (0.015) 
Constant 103.416*** 100.791*** 103.444*** 100.866*** 103.438*** 100.859*** 103.493*** 100.915*** 
 (4.076) (13.279) (4.074) (13.281) (4.075) (13.279) (4.079) (13.286) 
         
Obs. 150,741 150,741 150,598 150,598 150,598 150,598 150,598 150,598 
R-squared 0.617 0.085 0.618 0.086 0.618 0.086 0.618 0.086 
Firm FE YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Country FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
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Table 3 - Continued 
Panel C: Preferred model specification - Small euro area core countries  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
BRRD -93.229** -93.035** -93.076** -92.868** -93.099** -92.889** -93.131** -92.922** 
 (35.028) (35.032) (34.987) (34.991) (34.991) (34.996) (35.001) (35.005) 
BRRD x Treat 66.194 65.564 65.890 65.208 65.908 65.226 65.885 65.203 
 (44.822) (44.804) (44.722) (44.704) (44.729) (44.711) (44.720) (44.702) 
Crisis 56.917 57.356 57.621 58.170 57.683 58.236 57.523 58.077 
 (35.169) (35.333) (35.285) (35.443) (35.310) (35.469) (35.263) (35.421) 
Treat  6.259  6.550  6.535  6.553 
  (33.654)  (33.535)  (33.539)  (33.534) 
ITRAXX   -0.376** -0.362**     
   (0.139) (0.141)     
STOXX600     1.389** 1.384**   
     (0.514) (0.518)   
VSTOXX       -0.174*** -0.176*** 
       (0.054) (0.055) 
Constant 146.231*** 144.230*** 146.234*** 144.130*** 146.230*** 144.128*** 146.321*** 144.214*** 
 (9.528) (31.926) (9.523) (31.901) (9.523) (31.899) (9.539) (31.921) 
         
Obs. 23,323 23,323 23,305 23,305 23,305 23,305 23,305 23,305 
R-squared 0.497 0.265 0.498 0.265 0.498 0.266 0.498 0.265 
Firm FE YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Country FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Description: The table reports the results for the preferred DiD estimation on core euro area countries. Panel A includes all 
euro area core economies. Panel B focuses on large euro area core countries (France, Germany and Netherlands), while 
Panel C considers small euro area core countries (Austria, Belgium and Finland).  
The dependent variable is the GAP variable (i.e. difference between sovereign CDS and non-sovereign CDS spreads) 
calculated on daily data and expressed in bps.  
Firm and country fixed effects are included alternatively. Robust standard errors, clustered at firm level, are reported in 
parentheses.  
Note: The crisis dummy takes the value one from 1st July 2011 to 1st September 2012, zero otherwise. 
















Table 4 – The impact of BRRD on the sovereign-bank nexus: Euro area peripheral countries 
Panel A: Preferred model specification - Euro area peripheral countries  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
BRRD -4.327 -4.416 -4.684 -4.820 -4.734 -4.868 -4.771 -4.902 
 (23.019) (22.408) (22.825) (22.139) (22.830) (22.144) (22.828) (22.143) 
BRRD x Treat -27.518 -27.624 -27.424 -27.533 -27.423 -27.532 -27.414 -27.524 
 (28.314) (27.720) (28.159) (27.499) (28.158) (27.498) (28.154) (27.495) 
Crisis 83.666** 89.099*** 86.590** 92.941*** 86.579** 92.930*** 86.439** 92.800*** 
 (31.012) (30.673) (31.319) (30.939) (31.331) (30.951) (31.321) (30.940) 
Treat  40.128  40.255  40.253  40.242 
  (32.901)  (32.441)  (32.439)  (32.434) 
ITRAXX   -0.499*** -0.467***     
   (0.138) (0.144)     
STOXX600     1.142*** 1.064***   
     (0.315) (0.344)   
VSTOXX       -0.176*** -0.154*** 
       (0.048) (0.052) 
Constant 112.737*** 78.276*** 113.527*** 78.862*** 113.554*** 78.890*** 113.631*** 78.969*** 
 (7.491) (26.079) (7.545) (25.624) (7.548) (25.625) (7.544) (25.627) 
         
Obs. 32,735 32,735 32,469 32,469 32,469 32,469 32,469 32,469 
R-squared 0.411 0.197 0.414 0.204 0.414 0.203 0.414 0.203 
Firm FE YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Country FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Panel B: Italy    Panel C: Spain 
 (1)   (1) 
BRRD -46.059***   46.782*** 
 (1.386)   (2.502) 
BRRD x Treat 15.572***   -86.306*** 
 (1.789)   (2.986) 
Crisis 0.618   152.628*** 
 (1.660)   (3.791) 
Constant 118.017***   93.277*** 
 (0.897)   (1.119) 
     
Obs. 17,120   12,044 
R-squared 0.486   0.545 
Firm FE YES   YES 
Description: The table reports the results for the preferred DiD estimation on peripheral euro area countries. Panel A 
includes all euro area peripheral economies. Panel B focuses on Italy, while Panel C considers Spain.  
The dependent variable is the GAP variable (i.e. difference between sovereign CDS and non-sovereign CDS spreads) 
calculated on daily data and expressed in bps.  
Firm and country fixed effects are included alternatively in the estimation on the whole sub-sample. For the analysis on 
the single countries, firm fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors, clustered at firm level, are reported in 
parentheses.  
Note: The crisis dummy takes the value one from 1st July 2011 to 1st September 2012, zero otherwise. 








Table 5 – The impact of BRRD on the sovereign-bank nexus: Large European countries 
Panel A: Preferred model specification - Large EU countries  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
BRRD -14.885** -15.264** -14.891** -15.281** -14.899** -15.289** -14.916** -15.307** 
 (7.041) (7.042) (7.041) (7.042) (7.042) (7.043) (7.044) (7.044) 
BRRD x Treat -25.582** -23.971** -25.639** -23.991** -25.637** -23.989** -25.639** -23.991** 
 (10.415) (10.438) (10.422) (10.444) (10.422) (10.444) (10.422) (10.444) 
Crisis 45.369*** 50.771*** 46.034*** 51.799*** 46.074*** 51.842*** 45.985*** 51.748*** 
 (6.944) (7.285) (6.975) (7.339) (6.979) (7.344) (6.972) (7.336) 
Treat  11.359  11.223  11.222  11.223 
  (13.390)  (13.400)  (13.400)  (13.400) 
ITRAXX   -0.169*** -0.172***     
   (0.028) (0.028)     
STOXX600     0.635*** 0.667***   
     (0.086) (0.090)   
VSTOXX       -0.086*** -0.084*** 
       (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant 95.146*** 91.100*** 95.256*** 91.200*** 95.253*** 91.197*** 95.296*** 91.240*** 
 (2.352) (8.862) (2.352) (8.864) (2.352) (8.864) (2.354) (8.867) 
         
Obs. 307,250 307,250 306,700 306,700 306,700 306,700 306,700 306,700 
R-squared 0.662 0.064 0.662 0.065 0.662 0.065 0.662 0.065 
Firm FE YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Country FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Panel B: Preferred model specification - Large euro area countries  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
BRRD -30.711*** -31.325*** -30.711*** -31.341*** -30.726*** -31.354*** -30.749*** -31.379*** 
 (11.653) (11.662) (11.651) (11.661) (11.652) (11.662) (11.655) (11.664) 
BRRD x Treat -5.189 -3.611 -5.319 -3.746 -5.317 -3.744 -5.319 -3.746 
 (15.996) (16.058) (16.004) (16.067) (16.004) (16.068) (16.004) (16.067) 
Crisis 59.770*** 65.375*** 60.710*** 66.716*** 60.758*** 66.769*** 60.636*** 66.641*** 
 (10.695) (11.272) (10.746) (11.361) (10.752) (11.368) (10.741) (11.356) 
Treat  11.834  11.754  11.752  11.754 
  (19.775)  (19.798)  (19.799)  (19.798) 
ITRAXX   -0.251*** -0.251***     
   (0.043) (0.044)     
STOXX600     0.873*** 0.906***   
     (0.132) (0.138)   
VSTOXX       -0.118*** -0.114*** 
       (0.015) (0.015) 
Constant 104.137*** 99.474*** 104.295*** 99.618*** 104.294*** 99.617*** 104.353*** 99.675*** 
 (3.528) (12.908) (3.529) (12.913) (3.530) (12.913) (3.533) (12.918) 
         
Obs. 179,905 179,905 179,506 179,506 179,506 179,506 179,506 179,506 
R-squared 0.596 0.091 0.597 0.093 0.597 0.093 0.597 0.093 
Firm FE YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 









Table 5 - Continued 
Panel C: Preferred model specification - Large non-euro area countries  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
BRRD 3.475 3.413 3.461 3.399 3.462 3.399 3.454 3.391 
 (5.885) (5.861) (5.887) (5.862) (5.886) (5.862) (5.886) (5.861) 
BRRD x Treat -50.338*** -48.527*** -50.210*** -48.283*** -50.209*** -48.281*** -50.210*** -48.283*** 
 (10.420) (10.450) (10.423) (10.457) (10.423) (10.457) (10.423) (10.457) 
Crisis 25.531*** 30.595*** 25.867*** 31.244*** 25.896*** 31.274*** 25.856*** 31.230*** 
 (6.766) (6.999) (6.782) (7.033) (6.786) (7.037) (6.781) (7.032) 
Treat  8.303  8.040  8.039  8.040 
  (16.472)  (16.474)  (16.474)  (16.474) 
ITRAXX   -0.048** -0.055**     
   (0.023) (0.024)     
STOXX600     0.286*** 0.313***   
     (0.071) (0.076)   
VSTOXX       -0.037*** -0.040*** 
       (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant 82.426*** 79.691*** 82.483*** 79.746*** 82.478*** 79.741*** 82.497*** 79.761*** 
 (2.726) (11.908) (2.726) (11.910) (2.725) (11.911) (2.724) (11.912) 
         
Obs. 127,345 127,345 127,193 127,193 127,193 127,193 127,193 127,193 
R-squared 0.833 0.036 0.833 0.037 0.833 0.037 0.833 0.037 
Firm FE YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Country FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Description: The table reports the results for the preferred DiD estimation on large European countries. Panel A includes 
all large EU economies (i.e. France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom). Panel B focuses 
on large euro area countries (i.e. France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain), while Panel C considers large EU, non-
euro area countries (i.e. Sweden and United Kingdom).  
The dependent variable is the GAP variable (i.e. difference between sovereign CDS and non-sovereign CDS spreads) 
calculated on daily data and expressed in bps.  
Firm and country fixed effects are included alternatively. Robust standard errors, clustered at firm level, are reported in 
parentheses.  
Note: The crisis dummy takes the value one from 1st July 2011 to 1st September 2012, zero otherwise. 





Figure 1 - Sovereign and non-sovereign time series of CDS spreads 
 
Description: The figure illustrates daily time series of CDS spreads for (i) sovereigns, (ii) banks and (iii) non-financial 
corporates (in bps) for nine selected EU countries. 
Note: For comparability reasons, all the graphs have the same scaling on the vertical axis.  
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Figure 2 - CDS trends (pre-treatment period) 
 
Description: The figure illustrates annual average CDS spreads (bps) for (i)  
treated firms, (ii) untreated firms and (iii) respective sovereigns in the  
pre-treatment period (i.e. from July 2011 to December 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
